Explaining Interstate Conflict And Cooperation

There are two sets of questions below Jervis 1-5 and Larsen 6-10. Address one of the Jervis questions and one of the Larsen questions in a single answer that weaves both together coherently.  Length of the answer:  150-200 words.  1.  How exactly does an actor’s insecurity present them with a dilemma instead of a straightforward challenge on how to respond to it? 2.  How is it that two adversaries would end up cooperating with each other and still remain adversaries? 3.  What are the main differences between the Stag Hunt and the Prisoner Dilemma?  4.  What does Jervis mean by the terms “offense-defense balance” and then “offense-defense differentiation”? 5. Using the trust inventory and the evolution of trust activity, rate the degree of trust (high, mostly high, mostly low, low) for each of the four worlds described in the last of the Jervis article. Explain your ratings. 6.  Larsen suggests that trust among states is necessary for them to cooperate.  Would Jervis agree?  Why or why not? 7.  What is/are the core missed opportunities which concerned Larsen when she wrote the article?  What might be a core missed opportunity in the last four years?  Elaborate. 8.  Larsen suggests that distrust is often a function of a lack of empathy, and that without empathy it is easier to understand how another’s “aggressive” action is hostile while the same “aggressive” action undertaken by oneself is not hostile.  Do you think American leaders have empathy for U.S. adversaries?  Explain.  9.  For a current missed opportunity, describe a GRIT strategy that makes cooperation and conflict resolution more likely. 10.  Larsen contends that some state actors may not be reassured by one or two conciliatory actions taken by their adversary.  If that is the case, then what are the possible pitfalls of GRIT? Offer an illustration.